In the judicial system, the concept of "taking" (as the material element of the crime of theft) has always faced challenges in interpretation and application. Ambiguity in determining the precise boundaries of "taking" and distinguishing it from similar acts such as usurpation, breach of trust, and wrongful possession has led to discrepancies in judicial rulings and diverse theoretical understandings of the nature of theft. The main issue of this research is to identify which elements play a fundamental role in the realization of "taking" as a condition for the occurrence of the crime of theft, and how its boundaries can be distinguished from similar offenses. This study, adopting an analytical–descriptive approach and examining legal texts, current laws, and judicial procedures, investigates two essential conditions of "taking": the "prior legitimate dominion of the owner or lawful possessor over the property" and the "absence of prior dominion by the thief." The findings indicate that a simplistic interpretation of "taking" as "carrying away property without permission" has led to the conflation of legal concepts and created judicial challenges in identifying instances of theft. A precise redefinition of the affirmative and negative conditions of "taking," particularly the role of prior legitimate possession, is essential for theoretical coherence and the reform of judicial practice